Price of Freedom: Improving Domestic Revenue In Developing Countries by Combining Democracy with State Effectiveness by Onivogui, Jean Francois Koly
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Theses Department of Political Science
Fall 12-18-2013
Price of Freedom: Improving Domestic Revenue In
Developing Countries by Combining Democracy
with State Effectiveness
Jean Francois Koly Onivogui
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Political Science Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Onivogui, Jean Francois Koly, "Price of Freedom: Improving Domestic Revenue In Developing Countries by Combining Democracy
with State Effectiveness." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2013.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/58
      Thesis of Master of Art in Political Science   
PRICE OF FREEDOM: IMPROVING DOMESTIC REVENUES IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY COMBINING DEMOCRACY WITH STATE 
EFFECTIVENESS. 
                                                                                                                  by      Jean‐Francois Koly Onivogui   Under the Direction of Dr. Charles Hankla, PhD., Professor Associate         Abstract:    When it comes to improving tax revenues in developing countries, we do not have a clear  understanding  of  whether  it  is  more  important  to  have  democracy  or  state effectiveness.    Two  theories  have  prevailed  in  the  literature;  one  is  to  focus  on building  strong  states  that  can  have  financial  autonomy,  the  other  is    to  promote democracy with the assumption that democracy brings about economic growth. Yet for over four decades developing countries’ tax to GDP ratio is still desperately low. On average,  developing  countries  ‘tax  to  the GDP  ratio  is  less  that half  that  of  the OCDE  countries. This article contends that greater taxation outcomes result from the 
synergistic combination between democracy and state effectiveness. Empirical evidence 
from a time-series-cross-sectional dataset covering up to 120 countries during the 2003-
2012 time period supports the conclusion that two attributes working together increase 
tax revenue by 16% because they force political leaders to focus on citizens by improving 
their political participation (democracy) and by meeting voters’ basic needs 
(performance).    
  Index Words: Taxation, Democracy, State Effectiveness, Trust, Legitimacy       
                                                                                      Copyright by                                                        Jean Francois Koly Onivogui                                                  2013 
       Thesis of Master of Art in Political Science      by                                    JEAN FRANCOIS  KOLY   ONIVOGUI  
                    
 
 A thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of                                               Master of Art in Political Science                                                   in the College of Arts and Science                                                   Georgia State University                                                                 2013 
 
 
  
     
          Thesis of Master of Art in Political Science     by                                   JEAN  FRANCOIS KOLY   ONIVOGUI                                                                                                                                                                                      Committee Chair:  Charles Hankla,                                                                                                                                                                                                           Committee:  Ryan Carlin                                                                                                                                                 Carrie Manning     Electronic Version Approved:      Office of Graduate Studies  College of Arts and Sciences  Georgia State University     December 2013   
                                                         Dedication      To my loving parents, Iyee and Apaa, and to my extended family and friends:  the Carpenters, the Claytons, the Groves, the Lairds, the Mathews, the O’Hanleys, the Onivogui, and the Wyses.  Thank you for your love and support. 
     
                                                                                                         Acknowledgements  I owe a  lifetime gratitude to my  inspiring professors: Dr. Charles Hankla, Dr. Ryan Carlin,  Dr.  Carrie  Manning,  Dr.  Peter  Lindsay,  and  Dr.  Amy  Steigerwalt  for  their guidance  and  inputs,  their  help  in  data  analysis,  and  their  constant  constructive criticism.  I  am  grateful  for  their  words  of  wisdom  and  their  model  of  ongoing academic career. Equally,  my  gratitude  goes  to  the  entire  faculty  and  staff  of  the  Department  of political science of Georgia State University, especially to Tony Creighton, for being exemplary  in  service.  Not  only  have  they  been  available  for  discussion  and consultation,  but  also  they  continue  to  approach  their  students  with  respect  and thoughtfulness. This thesis, like my journey in the United States, is the result of a collaborative effort. The support and assistance of my family and sponsors, Arthur and Eda Mathews, Owen Mathews, Joan Groves O’Hanley and Roy O’Hanley, Ann Clayton Leichles, Amy and Walter Carpenter, Peg and David Wyse, Cecile and Ed Laird, my elder brother Jacques Massayan Onivogui, are especially appreciated 
     
 
                                  TABLE OF CONTENTS              Acknowledgment ……………………………………………………………………………1           List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………………3           List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………..3           Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..5           Expected  Results……………………………………………………………………………...6          I. Conceptual  Definitions…………………………………………………………………...8                    democracy and  state effectiveness………………………………………….....9                    definition and Importance of Taxation…………………………………….....10                    Tax  trends in the world……………………………………………………….…....11                     Taxation and colonial legacy ………………………………………………….…12            II. Democracy and Taxation in the Literature…………………….………………14            Theory………………………………………………………………………….…………………19             Research Design ………………………………………………………….………………….21                      Methodology……………………………………………………………………………25                      Results…………………………………………………………………………………….29             Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………………………………….30             Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………33              Appendix………………………………………………………………………………………...36              
 
     
                                                                                                                     LIST OF TABLES                Table 1 : Tax  Trends in the Worlds………………………………………………..12              Table2:  Summary of Descriptive Statistics………….………………………….26              Table3:  Empirical Results……………………………………………………….……..29              Table4:  Comparison of Tax levels…………………………………………………...31                                              
 
 
 
     
    
  A thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree   of                                              Master of Art in Political Science                                                   in the College of Arts and Science                                                   Georgia State University                                                                 2013                                                                            by                                                                                                                       Jean Francois Koly Onivogui                                                                                                                                                    Committee                                                                        Dr. Charles Hankla, Chair                                                 Dr. Ryan Carlin                                                 Dr. Carrie Manning                                                       October 8, 201313                                        Dr. Carrie Manning,                                                  Department Chair  
 
 
 
     
PRICE OF FREEDOM: IMPROVING DOMESTIC REVENUES IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY COMBINING DEMOCRACY WITH STATE 
EFFECTIVENESS. 
 
 
 
“The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may 
prepare—all this and more is written in its fiscal history” (Schumpeter [1918] 1954: 7). 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to improving the overall domestic tax revenue in developing 
countries, is it more important to have a democratic or an effective state? Do democracy 
and state effectiveness in combination synergistically produce greater tax return than 
either one of these political attributes acting alone?   One of the main goals of democracy 
promoters in developing countries is to improve political freedom along with the 
improvement of domestic public finances. The underlying assumption of this goal being 
public finances will increase following the improvement of civil rights and liberties in 
developing countries. Recently, reliable measures of democracy have indicated that 
democracy has made great strides specifically in the developing world. The remaining 
question is the following: has taxation improved after a progress of democracy in 
developing countries?  
Efforts to raise domestic revenues in developing countries in order to finance 
public goods have met with a long list of constraints, some political others structural.  
Researchers and democratic activists alike have pointed  to –among  others – the lack  of  
democracy, historical, geographical, or other socio cultural factors and have gone to a 
great length to find a solution to surmount these obstacles. However, despite applying 
     
these solutions, the need to increase domestic revenue in developing countries remains a 
constant concern. In addition, public finance recovery is still desperately low.  According 
to Baungard and Keen (2010), these internal revenue authorities recover  – at best– no 
more than 30 cents for every dollar spent in developing countries. More importantly, 
these developing countries raise on average less than half of what OECD countries 
collect in tax to GDP.  According to Helen Ehrahrt, developing countries have an average 
of 12.5% of tax to GDP compared to 28% in OECD countries in the years 1990-2005.  
While there are a host of unanswered questions about how democracy would impact 
positively public finances in developing countries, this paper hones on just one: Under 
what conditions could the recent democratic improvement in developing countries bring 
about an increase in tax to GDP i.e, domestic revenue?   
The motivation is twofold. First, even though the relationships between 
democracy and taxation have been of interest for well over two centuries, we are still not 
completely sure about how improvements of Freedom House scores translate to greater 
tax compliance. Second, exploring the impact of state effectiveness and its synergistic 
association with democracy is a worthwhile academic endeavor. The insight is that 
strengthening state effectiveness through performance and trust building between tax 
authorities and citizens improves citizens’ tax compliance and tax collection. Yet, despite 
numerous studies on the relationship between taxation and democracy, we do not have a 
clear cut answer to the aforementioned question probably because the interdependence 
between democracy and state effectiveness has remained unexplored. Thus, it is fair to 
assume that the relationship between democracy and taxation in the developing world 
seems less clear empirically and has been less well examined. 
     
This article argues that greater tax revenue (tax compliance and  tax collection) is 
the outcome of the complementarity between democracy and state effectiveness working 
in tandem. Without an effective state, there can be no efficient taxation. This point, of 
course, is by no means novel. Several scholars of democracy and state building have 
called attention to the role of the state in the recent years (Tilly, 1975; O’Donnell, 1986; 
Prezworski, 1990; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rose and Shin, 2001). What we would like to 
add to the literature is to provide an empirical substantiation to the theory explaining how 
democracy, combined with state effectiveness, increases citizens’ trust in state legitimacy 
to extract revenues.  
Expectations 
 Exploring the relationship between democracy, state effectiveness and taxation, 
this study uses a sample of 120 countries (developed and developing) over the course of a 
decade (2003-2012). We find that the impact of democracy on taxation differs depending 
on whether the country is developing or developed (here, OECD members) after holding 
constant other variables such as the states’ regulatory ability, their capacity to control for 
corruption, and their GDP per capita. Whereas democracy has a strong positive impact on 
taxation in OECD countries, it has virtually none to a negative effect on taxation in 
developing countries.  On the other hand, state effectiveness has a very small effect on 
taxation across all units, OECD and developing countries alike. Yet, the major finding of 
this paper is that when state effectiveness is coupled with democracy, the combined effect 
increases the tax to GDP by 16% in developing countries. We call “Effective democracy” 
the interaction variable generated by combining democracy and state effectiveness. 
     
This paper is organized as follows: the first section clarifies the meaning of 
concepts used in this study by providing specific definitions of democracy, state 
effectiveness and taxation.  It also highlights briefly the importance and the recent trends 
of taxation in both developed and developing countries. The next section succinctly 
summarizes the extant theoretical and empirical literature connecting democracy to 
taxation.  The third section constructs the main argument of the article, which is built on 
the works of Seymour Lipset’s, Jonathan K.Hanson’s, Shaoguang Wang’s  notions of 
state effectiveness. The fourth section provides a design and an empirical substantiation 
of  the theoretical  propositions made in the argument.  The final section offers a 
discussion followed by concluding notes. Additional information can be found in the 
appendix. 
 
I. DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY, STATE EFFECTIVENESS, AND 
TAXATION 
a) Definition of Democracy and State Effectiveness: Both democracy and state 
effectiveness are multidimensional in nature. While recognizing this complexity, 
this study seeks to define these concepts in a manner that is not only generalizable 
but also captures the essence of the object under consideration. Starting with 
democracy, we follow the two-dimensional definition put forth by Robert Dahl 
(1971): contestation and inclusiveness. The first dimension refers to participation 
or more precisely the rights for virtually all adults to vote and contest for an 
office.  The latter refers to the opposition’s rights, or creating institutionalized 
channels for a meaningful opposition by those who are adversely affected by 
     
government’s policies (quoted in Hanson p.4).  These two dimensions of 
democracy, rightly captured by Freedom House’s measures, have notably 
increased the recent four decades in developing world (see  Freedom House “ 
Freedom in the World  Report” 1973- 2010). 
 
Like democracy, the concept of state effectiveness conveys different meanings 
depending on whether one refers to it as a legal, fiscal, military, welfare or administrative 
concept. Also, state effectiveness has been also widely used in economics, sociology, 
strategic and political science literature. This paper follows Lipset’s definition of  state 
effectiveness and measures it with the index created by the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators (hereafter W.G.I). Lipset defines state effectiveness as the actual 
performance of government, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic function as 
most of its population and such powerful within it as business or army forces see it 
(p.65). Measured by the World Governance Indicators, Measured by the World 
Governance Indicators, state effectiveness captures the perception of the quality of public 
     
services and the degree of state effectiveness from political pressure, quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government commitment to 
such policies (W.G.I Methodology p.4).   Wang enumerates those public services that an 
effective state performs to be:  defining a political community that has citizens’ loyalty; 
protecting basic civil rights and liberties; cultivating trust between institutions, power 
holders and ordinary citizens; creating and maintaining a rule-based politics; vitalizing 
the civil society, and meeting people’s basic demands (p.7). 
 Definition and Importance of Taxation: The World Bank defines taxes as “unrequited 
compulsory payments collected primarily by the central government” (World Bank 1988: 
79). These imperative payments are distinct from other revenue sources including debts, 
entrepreneurial income, and user fees, in terms of obligations and administrative 
requirements (Lieberman, 2002 p.92). For Lorenz Von Stein, taxation represents both 
people’s civic duty and the state’s organizational ability to provide collective goods: 
Taxes are conceptually entirely different from all other public revenue… Taxes 
can be said to represent the nation’s entire civic sense on the economic plane…. 
In administering public property, the State is an independent economic agent with 
its own capital; fees and regalia represent a payment to the State in return for 
services rendered to individuals for the satisfaction of their individual needs. 
Taxation, by contrast, represents a field in national economic life where, by virtue 
of the State’s constitution and administration, part of the individuals’ economic 
income is withdrawn from them and becomes the community’s economic 
income… (Von Stein [1885] 1964: 28) 
Taxes have played three key roles the state-society relationship: taxes have been used as a 
device for state building, a solution for collective action problems underlying the 
provision of public goods, and a tool for distributive justice.  These three dimensions of 
taxation are crucial in sustaining mature democracies and improving new ones. First, 
     
from a practical point of view, tax extraction has been vital to the existence and the 
strength of states throughout history.  To highlight this cardinal role of taxation, 
Lieberman (2002) uses the analogy of food. Revenues gathered from taxes are like 
nutrients for our body; if the state ceases to extract revenues it ceases to exist (p.92). 
Second, as a solution to collective action problems, not only does taxation help to finance 
public goods but also it vitalizes the social contract between governors and governed.  By 
imposing a mandatory pecuniary contribution from citizens, revenue body gives to 
citizens the moral basis to hold the revenue body accountable, hence creating a “fiscal 
contract”. In other words, compliance to taxation provides citizens a genesis for their 
rights and responsibility to monitor the public funds.  Cameron G Thies (2007) adds that 
this fiscal contract produces a democratic relation between states and citizens because 
theses peaceful transactions (i.e., bargaining) become necessary to avoid coercive forms 
of revenues (these practices are considered incompatible with long-term democratic 
behavior (Rakner, p. 9).   In short, as Rakner points out bargaining has contributed to 
build institutional capacity and political legitimacy in order to generate revenues from 
citizens in the Western democracies (p.3).  Third, taxation is a political and financial 
device that performs a distributive justice function. As Guyer maintains, the collection 
and distribution of tax revenue implicitly or explicitly implicates policymaking in a 
society made up of individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds (Guyer, 
1992).  
Tax Trends in Recent Years   
When it comes to tax burden, the total fiscal effort as a share of the GDP, developing 
countries have paid around 1/3 of what OECD countries pay. Nonetheless, in general, 
     
taxation has increased in both regions taking the average OECD tax to GDP from 24.3% 
to 31.5% (Ross, 2002) while the non OECD countries’ average tax burden jump from 
14.4% to 18.9% of the GDP. On the other hand, East Asian countries were more reluctant 
to raise their taxes than those in Latin American countries and Sub Saharan Africa. 
Although developing countries had lower taxes already in 1970s, Ross maintains that the 
oil booms contributed in plummeting the tax to GDP ratio in oil producing countries 
(Ross 2002, p.14.). .) Recently, authors such as Helene Ehrahrt contend that from the 
period 1990 -2005, the average tax to GDP in developing countries dropped to about 10% 
compared with the figure of 27% for the OECD countries. 
 
Table 1: Tax Trends in the World  1970s- 2012 
   
Regions    Average of Tax to GDP in Years  
   
 1970s-1999  2000- 2012 
   
OECD countries 24.3%  to 31.5% 28.9% 
    
   
   
Developing Countries 14 % - 18% 10% 
 
    
   
 
Colonial Legacy and Taxation in Developing Countries 
Based on data from the International Monetary Funds, developing countries have a lower 
direct tax rate compared to OECD countries. Scholars attribute this low tax revenue to a 
broken taxation culture in developing countries, which is arguably rooted in the following 
causes: colonialist legacy, post-independence nationalist ideologies, institutional 
     
weakness, international aid and the actual political unwillingness to apply tax law.  
Specifically in Africa, taxation traces its roots to colonization, like many other aspects of 
the continent’s political culture.  Some scholars associate the negative African view of 
taxation with the continent’s colonial legacy. Colonial powers extracted tax revenues   
using fairly brutal means in developing countries (Guyer 1992 p.43).  Consequently, at 
the times of independence, populist leaders, inspired by nationalist ideologies, associated 
taxation with colonial rules. Guyer explains that at independence, taxation systems set up 
by colonial governments were dismantled by the new populist authorities, which lead to 
both the waning of state revenues and the weakening of states’ nascent institutions. In 
addition, to gain more popularity from their citizens, some politicians banned taxation 
altogether (p.56).  As a consequence, a host of issues followed as consequences of 
shrinking revenues. . In addition, to gain more popularity from their citizens, some 
politicians banned taxation altogether (p.56).  A host of issues followed as consequences 
of shrinking revenues.  
Moreover, this brutal colonial revenue extraction sowed the seed of states’ lack of 
legitimacy in the newly independent countries. Pierre Englobert (2000) highlights this 
aspect in his article “Pre-Colonial institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic 
Development in Tropical Africa.” He argues that since the new ruling class inherited the 
state from its former colonizers, rather than engaging in shaping it from within, they limit 
themselves at exploiting countries resource using similar tools as the colonizers. Hence, 
in developing countries, the state lacks legitimacy from the beginning. The state was not 
the result of a social contract or formed to reduce transaction costs. Instead, as Kasfir puts 
     
it, “from colonizers to new ruling classes, the state has been and continues to be an 
instrument used to appropriate resources, a sort of “fountain of privilege” (1983p.123)  
Detrimental implications of this lack of social contract and state’s legitimacy in 
developing countries include the pervasive distrust of governing bodies and the absence 
of a capable opposition. Opposition in such states did not form around particular policies, 
but around challenges to the government itself or even the very existence of the state. As 
a result, the rulers consolidated power by resorting to neo-patrimonial policies that 
enhanced their personal power through corruption, nepotism and clientelism at the 
expense of weakening state institutions (Englobert p.131).  Another negative 
characteristic of tax culture in developing countries is the strategic choice that political 
leaders make by willingly and unfairly exempting some sections of the population seen as 
electorally important (Englobert 2000 p.134).  Rakner and Gloppen highlight this 
phenomenon in Africa where, “the lack of political ability or political willingness to fully 
apply tax laws with full force to groups perceived as electorally important (p.19).  Given 
this detrimental legacy of colonialism in developing countries, what can be done in order 
to improve citizens’ contribution to public finance? Let’s search a possible answer in the 
extant literature.  
II. DEMOCRACY AND TAXATION IN THE LITERATURE 
Since the late 1960s, the relationship between democracy and taxation in 
developed and developing countries has figured prominently in several cross-national 
studies published in political science journals and books (Downs, 1960; DeSchweinitz, 
1964; Levi 1988; Prezworski, Haggard, 1990; Peters, 1991; Steinmo, 1993, 1998; 
Chaudhry, 1997; Cheibub, 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Ross, 2002, 2006; Herb 2005; 
     
Timmons, 2010; Ehrhart, 2012 etc..). This corpus of cross-national studies shows a 
theoretical disagreement among scholars about the impact of the type of regime on 
taxation or the effects of taxation on the type of representation. These diverging stances 
match only with the ambiguous empirical results leading the reader to an inconclusive 
consensus.  Rather than recapitulate that vast literature, we focus on one single aspect of 
the relationship - namely- the extent to which democracy brings about an improvement of 
domestic revenues in developing countries. The progress in statistical software and 
econometrics techniques, combined with the large availability of data, has enabled 
scholars to conduct empirically sophisticated studies on the relationship between 
democracy and taxation in developing countries.  Yet, the findings of these studies lack a 
consensus and span a continuum of a strongly positive relationship, a weak to no 
relationship, and a negative relationship.  For convenience and simplicity we group the 
extant literature in three groups: the first group consists of scholars who claim that 
democracy induces a greater taxation (DeSchweinitz, 1964; Levi 1988; Steinmo, 1993, 
1998;Cheibub, 1998); the second group that argues exactly the opposite, contending that 
democracy does not produce a successful taxation; instead, authoritarian regimes are 
better than democracy in improving internal revenues (Downs, 1960; Haggard, 1990; 
Prezworski, 1990; McGuire and Olson, Finlay,1996).  The last group sees no 
relationships, or at bests a very weak one, between democracy and taxation (Meltzer, 
1981; Profita et.al, 2009).   
The gist of the first argument is better stated by Margaret Levi (1988).  
Democracy delivers greater taxation because it reduces the cost of the collective action 
problem through the mechanism of a collective bargaining and quasi-voluntary 
     
compliance.  For Levi, this quasi compliance affects the level of taxation because it 
minimizes the cost compliance and collection (1988). Particularly, democracy is more 
efficient in increasing taxation due to its single ability to provide the two pillars of quasi- 
compliance: the perception that there is a bargain and the existence of insurance that 
government will keep its side of the bargain (quoted in Cheibub. p.356).  Emphasizing on 
citizens’ control and monitoring over public spending in democratic regime, Cheibub 
notes that the incentive to raise and spend is greater in democracy because “democracy 
serves as an ideal benchmark in the sense that government are assumed to be perfect 
agents of the citizens [the principle].  Thus, in democratic regimes, citizens decide 
through some kinds of voting mechanism about the size of the government and have the 
right to the fiscal residuum” (p.356).  Elsewhere, supporters of “democracy promotes 
better taxation hypothesis” argue that democracies can limit state intervention in the 
economy and are more responsive to public demands on areas such as education, justice, 
and health; thus they encourage citizens to willingly participate in the funding of public 
goods (Doucouliagos et. al, 2008). 
Opponents of the “democracy impacts taxation positively hypothesis” reject the 
premises above. Stephen Haggard indicates at least three reasons that make authoritarian 
regimes have greater incentive to increase taxation. First they use force to resolve 
collective action problems. Second, they are free from any citizen monitoring processes. 
Third, dictators do not lend themselves to any kind of popular approval or rejection. 
Olson and McGuire (1991) contend that dictatorships are obliged to continually raise 
public revenues to fund their insatiable pattern of wasteful and unchecked spending. 
Haggard corroborating with Olson and McGuire states: 
     
Since authoritarian political arrangements give political elites autonomy from 
distributionist pressures, they increase the government's ability to extract 
resources, provide public goods, and impose the short-term costs associated with 
efficient economic adjustment. Weak legislatures that limit the representative role 
of parties, the corporatist organization of interest groups, and recourse to coercion 
in the face of resistance should all expand governments' freedom to maneuver on 
economic policy (quoted in Cheibub p.354).   
 
However, the proponents of the argument “authoritarian regimes produce better taxation” 
fail to clarify how does the ability to use force is translated into a higher capacity to 
implement specific tax policies.  Also, as Cheibub demonstrates, to some extent, dictators 
are not immune from popular approval or discontent. Thus, the so-called autonomous 
attitude of authoritarian regimes is relative (p.358). Secondly, as for the argument about 
the sequence for political development, the author presents democracy and state 
effectiveness to be mutually exclusive.  The purpose of this paper is to show that these 
two analytically distinct political attributes can work together synergistically to create an 
effective democratic state capable of raising better taxation in developing countries.  
Yet, there are scholars who claim that the relationship between democracy and 
taxation is insignificant.   For these authors, there is simply not enough empirical 
evidence to conclude one way or the other that democracy leads to taxation.  For Meltzer 
and Richard (1981) it is impossible to predict if democracy or autocracy will lead to a 
bigger government size, and more progressive form of distribution. Similarly, Profeta et 
al. (2009) do not find any significant within-country effect of democracy and civil 
liberties on neither corporate indirect taxes nor social security contributions. Finally, 
authors such as Michelle D’Arcy (2012) point to the reverse of sequence in political 
     
development stages between state building and democracy in developing countries. 
For her, democratic regimes in developing countries  give rights to citizens, who 
do not reciprocate by performing their civic duties. This weakens the government’s 
ability to extract revenue from citizens 
Collectively, these earlier efforts to identify and, in some cases, gauge the impact 
of democracy on taxation have considerably increased the visibility and relevance of the 
topic in the political economy subfield.  Altogether, there is no doubt the previous authors 
deserve credits for undertaking research about the relationship between democracy and 
taxation in the developing world. Nonetheless, all of them sidestep the explanation of the 
tandem between state effectiveness and democracy to increase countries’ tax to GDP 
ratio. Especially, from the perspective of understanding democracy and state 
effectiveness as two analytically separate political attributes and their respective impacts 
on taxation across countries in the developing world, each of the above approaches has 
shortcomings.  In general, these efforts tend to:  
a. Include state effectiveness into democracy by using it as an embedded   
dimension of a democratic state; this leads to the neglect of state effectiveness 
that builds trust between citizens and democratic institutions through 
substantive performance and enhanced credibility.   
b.  View the two concepts as two mutually exclusive entities in the sequence of 
political development in developing countries; 
c. Confuse strong states with   authoritarian ones; 
d. Use metrics and methods that ignore the dynamicity of both democracy and 
effectiveness.  
     
The present study corrects these shortcomings by proposing a theoretical argument 
substantiated by robust empirical evidence.  
III. THEORY 
The major claim of this paper is that democracy and state effectiveness work 
better synergistically to improve taxation than either one of these factors acting alone. For 
a greater taxation, each of these two factors relies on the other in order to fully realize its 
potential. In this relationship, democracy supplies the motivation for power holders to 
deliver public service while state effectiveness provides the means (Hanson p.6).  The 
underlying sub-argument is that citizens will show increased tax compliance because not 
only does government officials act substantively to sustain its credibility but also, in so 
doing, it expands its own legitimacy to extract revenues. When citizens see their tax 
authority as trustworthy and benefit from its performance, their willingness to act by “do 
their parts” increases. They become true citizens who have rights through democracy, 
have their basic needs met from their government’s substantive performances, and take 
on their civic duties by complying to tax policies (Torgler et. al, 2002).  
 The interplay between democracy and state effectiveness can be better 
understood when we compare tax compliance outcomes in developed countries to that of 
developing countries.  The combination of democracy and state effectiveness results into 
a greater taxation in the OECD countries. The explanation follows the framework of 
“democracy brings economic growth theory” better articulated by Lake and Baum 
(2001): in a democratic system, a ready supply of alternative rulers and low costs of 
political participation induce rulers to commit close to the socially optimal level of 
spending on public resources. Similarly, democracy is claimed to facilitate the flow of 
     
information and enables the formation of groups that can demand social services (Sen, 
1999; McGuire 2010). Put simply, political leaders work to build a trust relationship 
between government and citizens, and government performs its duties. Wang enumerates 
these duties of state effectiveness to be  the following: defining a political community 
that has a citizens’ loyalty; protecting basic civil rights and liberties; cultivating trust 
between institutions, power holders and ordinary citizens; creating and maintaining a 
rule-based politics; vitalizing the civil society, and meeting people’s basic demands 
(p.19-34).    
Conversely, where democracy and state effectiveness do not work together, 
resources spent on building state legitimacy through public services are wasted due to 
institutional weakness or sheer lack of political incentives from power holders. That is, in 
the absence of institutions that can perform effectively, democratic processes – elections, 
recruitment of the executive and allocation of public goods tend to slide into a gigantic 
clientelistic network.  Alternatively, in situations where states display sufficient material 
capacity but put no political pressure on rulers, public goods that were supposed to be 
delivered to the masses stay circumscribed to a coterie of power holders (Hanson p.7).  
Both situations – the lack of substantive performances and that of political incentive– 
result into the loss of perception that the government is credible and legitimate, even if 
democratic indicators are positive.  In sum, the citizen feel abandoned for having to deal 
with numerous negative consequence of an ineffective state. As Wang puts it: 
Where governments lack adequate regulative capacity [state effectiveness], again 
whether democratic or not, people there typically have to put up with frequent 
industrial accidents and environmental disasters, untreated water, broken draining 
system, chaotic traffic, appalling work conditions, tense labor-management 
relations, shoddy consumer products, horrendous medical services, and the like. 
The contrast between the two types of countries clearly points to the significance 
     
of   the state effectiveness (p.16). 
 
This situation raises the question whether democracy is good for the poor.  Bueno de 
Mesquita and Michael Ross have given some explanation as to why democracy has not   
delivered in poor countries. For Ross (2006), the great majority of poor people in 
developing countries lack the political power to hold rulers accountable. Instead, political 
competitions bind rulers only to the small urban middle class. Bueno de Mesquita (2003) 
finds that it is not the level of democracy per se that determines the level of spending 
allocated to the public goods but the size of the coalition on which rulers depend for 
remaining in power.   
To summarize the argument, when democracy is combined with state 
effectiveness, the combination leads to a greater taxation because democracy provides the 
motivation for a political leader to build a political community while state effectiveness 
increases citizens’ trust in the system and its legitimacy, resulting to greater tax 
compliance. To test empirically this proposition, I generate the following hypothesis:  
When democracy works in tandem with state effectiveness, the synergistic 
combination leads to a substantial increase in tax to GDP ratio in developing countries.  
IV.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
To evidence the above theoretical formulation, I use the quantitative analysis with 
the following design: My units of analysis consists of developing countries spread over 
the six continents, with a number of cases N=120.  The period covered in this research 
start from 2003 to 2012. The dependent variable is country’s tax to GDP ratio, and the 
main independent variable is the interaction variable that combines countries’ level of 
democracy as measured by Freedom House and state effectiveness as measured by the 
     
World Governance indicators (W.G.I).  The alternative variables are democracy and state 
effectiveness acting individually. The control variables include countries’ GDP per 
capita, control of corruption, and their regulatory ability. 
  Economic and tax-related data (countries’ tax to GDP ratio) come from the World 
Bank dataset. They cover the decade from 2003 to 2012.  Likewise, countries’ 
governance effectiveness, state regulatory capacity and control of corruption data are 
drawn from the World Bank Governance Indicator dataset. Democracy measurement is 
taken from Freedom House website. The time span chosen in this article refers to the 
period seen in the literature as the post democratic transition in developing countries. 
Variable Operationalization 
The dependent variable is the countries tax to GDP ratio. The most important step 
in the construction of taxation as an indicator is the process of selecting and justifying 
which streams of revenue should be included and which should not. According to 
Lieberman, “these choices are based upon assumptions about incidence (who pays) and 
theoretically informed insights regarding what types of social and political dynamics 
affect revenue outcomes”(p.95).  In choosing the tax to GDP ratio, we select the totality 
of each country’s ability to collect revenues. Widely used by most political economists 
and other scholars involved in political and developmental studies, this indicator is 
constructed and interpreted as representing each society’ overall fiscal effort, size, and 
capacity.  
As Lieberman asserts, the choice of any kind of revenues comes with its 
advantages and negative consequences.  The selection of the tax to GDP implies that 
incidence is much less important than the overall burden on society as a single, collective 
     
actor. We put an emphasis on  the tax burden felt by the public as taxpayers. 
Furthermore, this choice entails that taxpayers react to tax burden according to the Mill’s 
Hypothesis in order to produce the political result hypothesized (see Index).  Admittedly, 
some scholars prefer the direct tax, seen as the purest form. However, given the 
complications of measuring tax incidence, the choice to use total tax collections may be a 
reasonable strategy (Cheibub 1998 p.106). Finally, we choose the tax to GDP ratio as the 
principal dependent variable because it correlates positively with civil liberties and 
political rights. 
a) The independent variable:  Interaction between democracy and effectiveness. 
b )Alternative  variables:  democracy and effectiveness acting individually. 
The measure of the first alternative variable, democracy, in this article is each country’s 
freedom score based on Freedom House’s measure of democracy.  Because we borrow 
the concept of freedom status from Freedom Houses’ nomenclature, we follow its 
definition. Freedom status is the score obtained after averaging each country’s rating of 
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House p.3).  In its 2012 report of Freedom in 
the world, Freedom House uses three broad categories of freedom status to classify 
countries: Free, Partly free and Not Free.  According to Freedom House, a Free country is 
one where there is open political competitions, a climate of respect for civil liberties, 
significant independent civic life and independent media. Such a country’s freedom status 
rating will be between 2 and 4.  A Partly Free country is one in which there is limited 
respect for political rights and civil liberties with the freedom score between 6 and 8.  
Additionally, Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, 
weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single 
     
party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism. Finally, Not Free countries,  
where the freedom score ranges from 9 to 14, are those in which basic political rights are 
absent and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.   We also follow 
Freedom House’s increasing order and recode democracy in two categories: 1 = Free; 2 = 
Not Free. 
The choice for Freedom House score is rooted in the fact its indexes capture 
political rights and civil liberties seen as the two overarching dimensions of democracy 
that has increased in the developing world. Freedom House contends that political rights 
enable people to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for 
public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have 
a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate (Freedom 
House).   As a consequent, the dimension of political rights is divided into three sub 
dimensions of the electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and the 
functioning of government.  As for the civil liberties dimension, it encompasses freedom 
of expression and belief, association and organizational rights, the rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights. These two components of the freedom score 
remind the reader of what the taxpayer receives upon demanding for more 
accountabilities and responsiveness.    
Admittedly, critics have voiced that most of these sub-dimensions are slanted 
toward more classical liberal principles.  Scholars such as Schneider and Schmitter 
(2004) contend that Freedom House overloads the concept of democracy with a host of 
characteristics that are all in one way or another related to democracy but are really facets 
of political liberalism, social justice, and security, which should not be confused with 
     
democracy as a characteristics of the political process. For them the distinction is crucial 
in that democracy is about holding the government accountable to citizens, while liberal 
principles aim at decreasing the  arbitrary encroachment of government—no matter how 
accountable it  may be —  in people’s private lives. In fact, they see the tenets of classical 
liberalism as precondition of democracy. A second criticism leveled at Freedom House’s 
measurement is that it equates administrative efficiency with democracy. However, real 
life experience shows democracies’ capacity to make and enforce decision may even be 
worse than that of dictatorships, where fewer actors are given opportunity to oppose or 
debate policies.  As a result Freedom House’s critics (Schneider and Schmitter, 
Przerworki to enumerate few) subscribe to the minimalist definition of democracy, which 
emphasize the electoral competitiveness and accountability. 
c) Control Variables: Countries’ GDP per capita, state regulatory quality, and control of 
corruption. 
 i. The GDP per capita:  The World Bank defines the GDP per capita as the gross 
domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars (W.B). 
ii. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development (WGI).  
iii. Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
     
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Each of these variables, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption are index built by combining regulatory data 
from Both the Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption are constructed by the 
W.G.I The WGI are composite governance indicators based on 30 underlying data  
sources.  These data sources are rescaled and combined to create the six aggregate 
indicators using a statistical methodology known as an unobserved components model.  
A key feature of the methodology is that it generates margins of error for each 
governance estimate. Originally, WGI reports its measures in two ways: in the standard 
normal units of the governance indicator, ranging from around -2.5 to 2.5, and in 
percentile rank terms ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries 
worldwide (WGI Methodology p.5). However, in order to gauge precisely the effects of 
state effectiveness, we rescale the measurement to range between 1 and 3. 1 capturing the 
value of weak state, 2 the value of moderately effective and 3 highly effective. The 
summary of variables’ descriptive statistic is the table below: 
 
Table 2:  Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  Obs Means Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Tax 1181 17.411 7.8468 0.1 61 
democracy 1199 1.2 0.4273 1 2 
lngdp 1185 14169 18181 111.2 11.6458 
Effectivedem 1115 3.4757 1.4046 0 5 
Regulatory Q. 1200 0.2837 0.9318 -2.34 2 
Control Corrup 1200 0.1874 1.0575 -2.5 2.5 
  Effectiveness 1115                1.973 .1875   1                      3 
 
 
     
METHODOLOGY 
a) Time-series- cross-section models  
The nature of the  question under investigation  and the structure of the data lead 
us to use a Time-series- cross-section (T.S.C.S) models to measure the long term effects ( 
a decade from 2003 to 2012) of the interaction variable, “Effective democracy,” on 
taxation. According to Nathanael Beck (2004), a time-series- cross-section data is one 
type of repeated observation data that is commonly analyzed in political science and 
related disciplines. T.S.C.S. data is common in the analysis of data where repeated 
observations (often annual countries’ Freedom scores and effectiveness) are made on the 
same fixed political units (usually states or countries’ tax to GDP ratio). Although the 
linear equation of a T.S.C.S. model assumes that all units map the covariates into the 
dependent variable identically, the way to drop this assumption and allow each unit to 
have its own intercept is to add a term (ai) to the equation. This can be done by adding a 
series of unit dummy variables to the specifications called `fixed effects' (Beck, 2004). 
One consequence is the reduction of the degree of freedom. However, Neck contends that 
with a reasonably large T (say over 10), fixed effects do not use up an absurd number of 
degrees of freedom because as T gets bigger, we get better and better estimates of the 
fixed effects. Furthermore, according to Trivedi and Cameron, the fixed effect (FE) 
allows obtaining a consistent estimate of the marginal effect of the j th regressor. More 
important, the estimates obtained are time varying even if the regressors are endogenous 
(p.237).   The fixed effect model is in the equation (1) 
γ  =α +βχ1t1 +βχ2t2 +βχ3t 3+βχ4t4+………+βχnt n.εIT   (1)  
Where  γ  represents the dependent variable the tax to GDP ratio on which we regress the 
     
following independent variables χ1  to χ5   the lagged dependent variable,  democracy, 
state effectiveness, effective democracy( the interactive variable), the gdppercapital, the 
control of corruption, and the regulatory quality.   α  represents the intercept and the βs 
represent the coefficients of the parameters.   
Another T.S.C.S.model that estimates individual effect is the random effect.  In 
the random effect model (RE), it is assumed that the intercept is purely random; a 
stronger assumption implied that the random effect singled out is not correlated with the 
regressors.  Trivedi and Cameron indicate that one advantage of the (RE) model is that it 
yields estimators of all coefficients and hence marginal effects, even those of invariant 
regressors (p.255).  Like in the fixed effect model, whereas both democracy and 
effectiveness did not appear to be statistically significant in the above model, effective 
democracy, the interactive variable has not only a positive coefficient but it is statistically 
significant as well.   Nonetheless, we base our analysis solely on the outputs of the fix 
effect model because Trivedi and Cameron recommend that the (RE) model’ estimates 
are inconsistent if the post estimation, (i.e., the goodness of fit) tests indicate that the (FE) 
model is appropriate.   
Yet with these results, comes the second challenge to modeling a T.S.C.S data— 
namely— the issue of serial collinerarity caused by the dynamicity of time. In this case, 
scholars indicate to include the lagged dependent variable (Hendry, Pagan and Sargan, 
1984; Hendry and Mizon, 1978) to solve the serial collinearity challenge. Following this 
recommendation, we lag the dependent variable for one year and test to see, if despite 
this operation, the interaction variable still matters. The results indicate that effective 
democracy remains a statistically significant upward driver of internal revenues in 
     
developing countries. We complete the method section by using a Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation model, which provides robust standard errors. 
After recoding the variable taken from the WGI (state effectiveness,) to start at 0 
as the minimal value and 3 as the maximal value, we measure the impact of the 
interaction variable, “Effective democracy” on taxation using the three models, Fixed 
effects (FE) in the first column, Random Effect (RE) in the second column, and the 
Maximum (MLE) in the third one.  The result table below displays each model’s outputs 
(each variable’s coefficient, statistical significance, and standard errors). 
Table 3: Results of the Three Models: (FE), (RE) and (MLE) 
                                       EMPIRICAL            RESULTS      
Variables                       Models    
      
 Fixed  Effects Random Effects   MLE  
 Coef.  P-val. Std. E Coef P-val Std.E Coef   P-val Std. E 
lagged tax 
 .962 0.00 .009 .960 0.00 .010 .95 0.00 0.10  
           
Effective 
democracy .161 0.00 .061 .155 0.00 0 .162 0.00 .058  
           
democracy -.195 0.30 .188 -.16 0.381 .185 -.20 0.294 .192  
           
Effectiveness .601 0.14 .380 .57 0.125 .373 .62 0.100 .382  
           
Control corruption .049 0.74 .151 .034 0.839 .149 .501 .643 .765  
Gdp percapita 2.22 .622 3.52 2.72 5.52 5.5 2.67 631 5.5  
Regulatory quality -.079 0.61 .342 -.06 .694 .152 -.07 .543 .542  
   
 The log likelihood: -2173,9198 
 
 
 
     
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
     As shown in the above table, across the three models, in developing countries, 
democracy by itself has no effect on taxation; the P-Value is beyond the acceptable 
threshold  (0.005). For instance in the Fix Effect model, democracy’s P-value = 0.300, 
RE democracy’s P-Value =0.381, and 0.294 for the MLE for despite the robust standard 
errors.   This finding corroborates the section of the theory, which maintains that mere 
increase in civil and political rights in developing countries is an insufficient condition to 
improve taxation.  Equally, state effectiveness is not statistically relevant ( P-value = 
0.14) despite having a positive intercept. The insignificance of the state effectiveness 
speaks to the institutional weakness and, or the lack of political willingness to 
substantively perform and to meet citizens basic needs in most developing countries.   As 
for the control variables, the log gdp per capita, the control for corruption, and regulatory 
quality, neither of these variables prove to decrease the positive impact of the primordial 
independent variable: Effective democracy. The major finding of this investigation is that 
the synergistic combination of democracy and state effectiveness increases substantially 
tax revenue by 16% for both  the FE model, and the MLE and  15%  for the RE models. 
After a conclusive Hausman test, confirming that the null hypothesis is non significant ( 
P-Value 0.023), we use the 16% as the final output in term of revenue increase when 
democracy and state effectiveness  work in tandem.       
            These results substantiate empirically the abundant scholarship on tax 
compliance. They point to the fact that a responsive government enhances both tax 
morale and tax compliance by increasing what Hetherington calls people’s evaluation of 
government’s performance relative to their normative expectation of how it ought to 
     
perform( p.13). A government that commits itself in building trust through effective 
performance sends a strong signal to taxpayers that their demands have been taken into 
account. As Christine Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) argues, the three components of trust 
induced by democracy that influence taxpayers behavior and consequently the tax 
capacity of the government are government’s legitimacy, i.e., citizens’ approval of the 
government; government’s efficiency, which refers to whether or not the government 
performance lives up to citizens’ expectations; and government’s credibility, which refers 
to the predictability and durability of government’s actions (p.15).  
 
                                 VII. CONCLUSION   
On the outset of this study, we aimed at demonstrating that when democracy and 
state effectiveness work in tandem, the tax revenue increases because these two attributes 
force political leaders to focus on citizens by improving their political participation 
(democracy) and by meeting voters’ basic needs (performance).   State effectiveness 
combined with democracy will provide what Tilly(1975) calls “ internal 
homogenizations” (p.66) which entails the transformation of people’s commitment and 
loyalty from smaller tribes, villages or petty principalities to a larger political system 
creating a common national culture of loyalty and commitment to a political community. 
In order words, this fundamental function will correct one of the most challenges in state 
building  efforts highlighted in Joel Migdal’s States in Society(2001), the dispersed 
loyalty of citizens in developing countries. , when citizens see their tax authority as 
trustworthy and benefit from its performance, they are willing to contribute. They 
become true citizens who have rights through democracy, benefit from the performances 
     
of their government, and take on their civic duties by complying to tax policies.  In developing countries, the price of freedom is the investment required to establish a citizen’s  trust  in her political  community. How to build this trust though substantive 
performance is an interesting topic for future researches. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Bibliography 
 
D’ Arcy Michelle. 20102. Taxation, Democracy, State Building: How does Sequence  
Matter? Quality of Government Institute. 
 
Aymar Fauvelle Christine- .1999.1999. “The Political and Tax Capacity of Government  
in Developing Countries.” Kyklos 52: 391-413 
 
Baunsgaard, T. and M. Keen (2010) “Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization”  
Journal of Public Economics, 94(9-10), pp. 563-577. 
 
Beck, Nathaniel. 2004. Time –Series Cross-Section. AJPSR. 
 
Chaudry, Kiren Aziz. 1997. The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the  
Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
 
Cheibub, Jose Antonio.1998. “Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of  
Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships.” World Politics 50: 
 349-376. 
 
Dahl Robert.1971.Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University  
Press 
 
De Mesquita, Bueno. 2003The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
DeSchweinitz, Karl.1964. Industrialization and Democracy (New York: Free Press.   
Doucouliagos et. al.2008.  Democracy and Economic Grow Meta- Analysis AJPSR 
 
Downs, A. 1960. Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy. World 
Politics, 12(4): 541-563. 
 
Ehrahrt, Helene.2012. “ Assessing  the Relationship between democracy and domestic  
tax in Developing Countries”.Enonomic Bulletin. CERDI Universite D’Auvergne. 
Freedom House  from  <<http://www.freedomhouse.org >> 
 
Guyer, J 1992. “Representation without taxation: An essay on democracy in rural 
Nigeria, 1952-1990” African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (April). 
 
Haggard, Stephan.1990. Democracy and Economic Growth. Cambridge Press.  
Hanson, Jonathan K. 2012 “ Democracy and State Capacity: Complement or 
Substitute?”.  
 
Herb, Michael. 2005. ‘‘No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and  
Democracy.’’ Comparative Politics 37 (3): 297–316. 
International Monetary Funds website. www.imf.org 
     
 
Lake, David A. and Matthew A. Baum. 2001.“The Invisible Hand of Democracy:  
Political Control and the Provision of Public Services.” Comparative Political  
Studies. 
 
Levi Margaret.1988. Of Rule and Revenue ,Berkeley: University of California Press.   
Lieberman, Evan S. 2002. “Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations:  
Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research.” Studies in Comparative and  
International Development 36 (4): 89–115. 
 
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and  
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review 
53 (1959):69-105. 
 
McGuire, James W. 2010. Wealth, Health, and Democracy in East Asia and Latin  
America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Meltzer, A., Richard, S. (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of 
Political Economy, 89(5): 914-927. 
 
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1992. “Delegative Democracy?” East-South Systems 
Transformation, University of Chicago, Working Paper No. 21. 
 
Olson, “Mancur.1991.“Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity," in Richard J.  
Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy and Choice (Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Organski, A. F. K., and Kugler, Jacek. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
 
Prezworski and Fernando Limongi.1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
  
Profeta, P et. al (2009). Does Democracy Affect Taxation? Evidence From 
Developing Countries. 
 
Rakner Lise and Siri Gloppen.(2005). Tax Reform and Democratic Accountability in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/Rakner-Gloppen.pdf 
 
Rose, Richard and Doh Chull Shin. 2001. “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of 
Third-Wave Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 31(2): 331–354. 
Ross, M. L. (2004) “Does tax lead to representation?” British Journal of Political 
     
Science,34, pp. 229-249. 
 
Ross, Michael L. 2006. “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” American Journal of 
Political Science 50(4):860–874. 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. [1918] 1954. “The Crisis of the Tax State.” In International 
Economic Papers,No. 4, eds. A. Peacock et al. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 
 
Steinmo, Sven. 1993. Taxation and Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Steinmo, Sven and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1998. “Do Institutions Really Matter? Taxation in 
Industrialized Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 31: 165-187. 
 
Thies Cameron, G.2007. Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Journal of Politics (2007) 69:716-731 
 
Tilly, Charles. 1975. The Formation of National States in Western Europe, chap. Western 
State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation, pp. 601–638. 9. Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Tilly, Charles, 1992, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992, Oxford: 
 
Timmons, Jeffrey.2010. taxation and Representation, Recent History. Journal of Politics. 
 
Torgler, Benno.2004. For or Against  People:The Impact od Bottom Up Approach On 
Tax Morale and The Shadow Economy. School of Economics. Switzerland. 
 
Von Stein, Lorenz. [1885] 1964. “On Taxation.” Pp. 28-36 in Classics in the Theory of 
Public Finance, eds. R. Musgrave and A. Peacock. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 
 
Wang, Shaoguang;2012. State Effectiveness and Democracy: Asia Cases. Yale 
University. 
 
World Bank. 2012. World Governance Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
 World Bank. 2012. World Countries Tax to GDP Ratio. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Appendix   
     
Stata outputs on the three models. 
 
  
     
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
